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GIS IN AN AGE OF HOMELAND SECURITY: ACCESSING




Critical to the goal of achieving sustainable development is
governments' ability to maintain public information, including
maps, charts, statistics, and narrative text, about a wide variety of
environmental factors, indicators, resources, and threats in easily
understandable formats that are readily accessible to the public.
While federal and state freedom of information laws help to ensure
a relatively high rate of public access to traditional information,
such as environmental impact statements, studies and reports,
significant environmental events and resources, and census data,
the growing use and reliance on geographic information systems
("GIS") has the potential to move the public discourse to a more
sophisticated plane. GIS continues to be used as an effective
planning tool, enabling users to access information relating to,
among other things, existing conditions, environmental assess-
ments, impact statements, transportation studies, and community
studies.'
GIS is a type of computerized mapping, yet it is not limited
solely to map form because information about a location can be
represented through charts, graphs or tables in ways that are
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unavailable to traditional paper maps.2 A GIS system is designed
to "determine the capture, management, manipulation, analysis,
modeling, and display of spatially-referenced data for solving
complex planning and management problems."3 Its purpose is to
store and analyze objects and "phenomenon [sic] where geographic
location is an important characteristic or critical to the analysis."4
GIS has also been defined as "a spatial abstraction of the real
world, including infrastructure, cultural, social, physical, economic,
and other spatially related information, which abstraction is used
to solve problems associated with the data whose common attrib-
utes are related to space and geography."5 The New York State
Geographical Information Systems ("NYS GIS") Clearinghouse
explains that "[t]he value of GIS and spatial data can be seen most
dramatically in applications ... that promote economic develop-
ment, public health and safety, and environmental quality. 6
Used exclusively in federal military projects for approxi-
mately twenty-five years,7 today other branches of government as
well as the private sector are able to use GIS in a variety of helpful
ways. For example, GIS has been used to plot the best hurricane
evacuation route,8 to plot the shortest route from a police or fire
2 See generally ANDY MITCHELL, ZEROING IN: GEOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AT WORK IN
THE COMMUNITY xi-xxi (Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc. 1997).
' Bd. of Assessment App. v. AM/FM Int'l, 940 P.2d 338, 340 (1997); see also
Jennifer L. Phillips, Comment, Information Liability: The Possible Chilling
Effect of Tort Claims Against Producers of Geographic Information Systems
Data, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 743, 745 (1999) (summarizing various descriptions
and definitions of GIS which are used in the field).
'Jeremy Speich, Comment, The Legal Implications of Geographical Information
Systems (GIS), 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359,361 (2001) (quoting STANARNOFF,
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS: A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 41 (1993)).
5 AMI/FMInt'l, 940 P.2d at 340.
6 Executive Briefing Paper: Why Should You Consider Geographic Information
Systems?, http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:_84OFm8oNbAJ:n3sgis.state.
ny.us/briefing.htm&hl=en&lr=&strip=O (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
Phillips, supra note 3, at 745 (citing ARNOFF, supra note 4, at 19, tbl.2).
s Scott D. Makar & Micahel R. Makar Jr., Geographic Information Systems:
Legal and Policy Implications, 69 FLA. BAR J. 44, n.1 (1995).
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station to an accident scene or other emergency location,9 and to
overlay specific crimes on a map in an attempt to glean patterns.10
GIS data collection is aided through the use of the Global
Positioning System ("GPS"). The GPS was "[d]eveloped by the
United States Department of Defense (DOD), . . . [and] utilizes a
constellation of twenty-four satellites which orbit approximately
11,000 miles above the Earth."" The system is designed so that at
any point in time there will be at least four satellites "in view' of
a GPS receiver located anywhere on the globe."' 2 The receiver
measures its distance from the satellites to calculate its position on
Earth. 3 In 1995, GPS technology was made available for use by
the general public.' 4
Currently, forty-two states along with the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico have laws relating to GIS systems. The
majority of the laws require the establishment or maintenance of
9 MITCHELL, supra note 2, at 4.10 Makar, supra note 8, at 44.
[A] database could contain spatial information on the
Eisenhower Interstate System. Each interstate could have
tabular information associated with it, including volume,
average width and bridge tonnage. The spatial information is
arranged in layers, or overlays, and each added layer, for
example, flood plains, is laid out across the other. The tabular
information is then linked with the spatial information, allowing
each to be accessed by the other at a coordinate. This would
enable an operator to map the safest and most efficient shipping
route for sixty-ton trucks during the rainy season in Iowa, while
also identifying potential trouble spots.
Speich, supra note 4, at 362 (citations omitted).
11 James R. Walter, Note, A Brand New Harvest: Issues Regarding Precision
Agriculture Data Ownership and Control, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 431, 435 (1997)
(quoting Grant Mangold, How does Global Positioning Really Work?,
SUCCESSFUL FARMING, Feb. 1996, at 14).
12 Walter, supra note 11, at 436 (citing MARK MORGAN & DAN Ess, THE
PRECISION-FARMING GUIDE FOR AGRICULTURISTS 10-11 (John E. Kuhar ed., John
Deere Publishing 1997)).
13 Walter, supra note 11, at 436.
14 Id.
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a statewide GIS system or clearinghouse, 5 while some state laws
relate to freedom of information.' 6 The remainder either establish
a center for information technology,' 7 discuss qualifications for a
GIS mapper,'8 or discuss liability."9
The promise of GIS for sustainable development is great,
but this potential continues to be met with growing challenges.
Most challenges arise out of homeland security concerns in a post-
September 11th era,2" when articles and reports document dozens
of instances where federal and state government agencies have
15 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-173 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-21-504 (West
2004); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 51017 (West 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 50-921.04
(2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-33-0 (2004); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT § 20/6 (2004);
IND. CODE § 2-1-9-10 (2004); IOWA CODE § 446.7 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
CH. 21A § 4B (2004); MINN. STAT. § 466.03 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-563
(2004); N.H. ADMIN. R.ANN. § 4-c:8 (2004); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW§ 44-0117
(McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89C-3 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1501-
205.1 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 196.575 (2004); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 1917
(2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-11-2 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 122 (2004);
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 43.63A.550 (West 2004).
16 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-148s (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-29-2 (2004); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 92-21 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 149.338 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T § 10-905 (LexisNexis 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWsANN. § 54.261 (West 2004);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-7 (2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 82.1035 (2004); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 239.054 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-23 (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN., §
7-38-9 (West 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.966 (West 2004).
17 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 14.40.095 (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1051 (2004); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1881 (2004); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.021 (Vernon 2004).
"' COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-25-202 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT § 89C-3 (2004); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1504.02 (West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-22-225 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-5501 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63A-6-201 (2004); VA.
CODE ANN. 2.2-2025 (2004); W.VA. CODE § 24E-1-1 (2004).
19 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104 (2004).
20 See JOHN C. BAKER ET AL., MAPPING THE RISKS: ASSESSING HOMELAND
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION
(RAND Corporation, prepared for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
2004), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RANDMG 142.
pdf. The report begins: "In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
U.S. officials have instituted information protection policies aimed at bolstering
homeland security. These policies aim to minimize the opportunities of potential
attackers exploiting publicly available information they might obtain from
federal sources in planning attacks against U.S. homeland locations." Id. at xvii.
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removed and/or altered spatial data and other related information
from their publicly-accessed web sites.2 ' This has presented a
growing concern within parts of the environmental community
that the government is depriving citizens of their right to know
about certain environmental dangers in their communities.22
Making matters worse is the fact that a significant amount of the
disappearing data from certain government-sponsored websites
was available to the public from either other government websites
21 The government did not begin removing data from web sites and other means
of public access as a result of September 11, 2001, the practice predates the
terrorist attacks. One librarian who has dealt with spatial information for nearly
two decades notes that
[e]ven before Sept. 11, 2001, there were a number of reasons
why government agencies withheld information from libraries
and the public .... Data availability was limited because of the
Cold War, federal legislation protecting certain types of natural
and relict human features, Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADAs), exorbitant government
information pricing, and the threat of potential terrorism.
Linda Zellmer, How Homeland Security Affects Spatial Information, 24
COMPUTERS IN LIBR. 4 (2004), available at http://www.infotoday.comcilmag/
apr04/zellmer.shtml. Zellmer further notes that "[m]uch of the spatial data that
has been removed from the Web and libraries contains information regarding
critical infrastructure, including water supply, transportation, emergency
services, and energy. Access to environmental information has also been
curtailed." Id.; see also BAKER ET AL., supra note 20, at 1 ("Since the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, federal government agencies
have withdrawn some data and information that was publicly available before
the attacks. These restrictions have included removing geospatial information
from Web sites and federal depository libraries.").
22 See Joseph A. Seigel, Terrorism and Environmental Law: Chemical Facility
Site Security vs. Right-To-Know?, 9WIDENERL. SYMP. J. 339, 340-41, n.13 (2003)
(citing concerns raised by the U.S. Public Interest Research Group at a
November 8,2001, hearing before the Subcommittee on Water Resources and the
Environment); see also The Role of the Public's Right to Know in Increasing
Public Safety after September 11th, Before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Water Resources and
Environment, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Baumann Testimony] (Testimony
of Jeremiah D. Baumann, Environmental Health Advocate, U.S. Public Interest
Research Group ("PIRG") and the National Association of State PIRGs),
available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/l 1-08-01/baumann.html.
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or from sites maintained by private and nonprofit entities,23
putting in doubt the actual security risk posed by an open-access
policy. Those who initially decided to withdraw GIS data from
public accessibility may have done so under time pressure without
allowances for careful study and analysis, and absent guidance
from senior-level managers.24 To remain consistent with American
societal democratic ideals, however, government must now follow
the legal framework that has long promoted public access to
government information. Moreover, government must carefully
safeguard open access to information that advances the ability of
communities to plan for and to protect against environmental and
public health concerns.
In 1992, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment adopted twenty-seven principles and goals of cooperation to
strengthen capacity building for sustainable development through
the use of both technology 5 and full and informed citizen participa-
tion.26 Fully informed citizen participation creates "transparency"27
23 Zellmer, supra note 21.
24 BAKER ET AL., supra note 20, at 3.
21 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-4, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 9, U.N. Doc A/CONF.
151/26/Rev. 1 (Vol I) (1993) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (stating that "[s]tates
should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable
development by improving scientific understanding through exchanges of
scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the development,
adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative
technologies").
26 Rio Declaration, supra note 25, Principle 10.
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level,
each individual shall have appropriate access to information
concerning the environment that is held by public authorities,
including information on hazardous materials and activities in
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in
decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage
public awareness and participation by making information
widely available.
Id. The concept of citizen involvement contained in this principle is central to
realizing many of the other twenty-six Rio principles, including achievement of
[Vol. 30:55
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in government decision-making, "improv[ing] the credibility, effec-
tiveness, and accountability of governmental decisionmaking
processes ultimately result[ing] in better implementation of sus-
tainable development objectives."28 Environmental justice advo-
cates have relied on both government and Internet-provided GIS
data to learn about public health and environmental risks present
in various minority and low-income communities across the
country.29 This very data has now been categorized as meeting the
definition of "critical infrastructure" for purposes of planning for
homeland security.3" Some believe that due to the aggressive
"efforts of cable television and telephone companies to bring...
cable to their customers.., large volumes of geographic informa-
tion could be widely and regularly distributed to the public in
[individual] homes before the middle of this decade."31 As long as
relevant government-collected information continues to be made
equity, integrated decisionmaking, poverty eradication, unsustainable consump-
tion and precaution. Id.; see also Frances Irwin & Carl Bruch, Public Access to
Information, Participation and Justice, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY
511, 512 (John C. Dernbach ed., Environmental Law Institute 2002).
27 Irwin & Bruch, supra note 26, at 511.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Aguilar & Haracz, supra note 1 (describing how GIS is used to assist
in the analysis of environmental justice issues. Environmental justice advocates
integrate the federally provided Toxic Release Inventory with GIS data to assess
burdens of industrial air pollution on impacted communities.); see also Seigel,
supra note 22, at 348.
30 BAKER ET AL., supra note 20, at 2 (defining "critical infrastructure sectors" as
"agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense
industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation,
banking and finance, chemical industry and hazardous materials, and postal
and shipping").
" Jack Dangermond, Sharing Government's Digital Geographic Information with
the Public, 1 GIS LAW, no. 3, 19-20 (1993). Dangermond, the President of
Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc., a major player in the GIS
industry, asserts that "[w]hen [citizens] share more concretely in the fruits of
data gathering, they may be more willing to support further development of data
gathering; and when they understand problems more clearly, they may be better
able to solve them." Id. Dangermond concludes that "we're at the beginning of
an important and beneficial revolution in the use of one kind of government
information technology." Id.
2005]
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public, increased cable access presents an opportunity for a more
informed citizenry on myriad environmental sustainability issues.
I. GIS DATA AND THE PROMISE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
The American Planning Association ("APA") recognizes the
importance of GIS as a land use planning tool that "enables
governments to more quickly and [accurately] portray, communi-
cate, and analyze existing and potential [environmental] conditions
from a visual perspective,"32 thus fostering greater understanding
of complex environmental issues.33 Noting that the general
availability of "GIS [data] enables the public and other organiza-
tions to be better informed and more effectively involved in the
governing process," 4 the APA recommended a model state statute
for GIS as part of its Growing Smart effort. Among other things,
the model statute calls upon states to establish statewide GIS
clearinghouses and geographic information advisory boards, and
to address data sensitivity issues so that information is available
to the public without compromising needed confidentiality.35 Prior
32 GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING





351 Id. at 15-1 to 15-16. The model statute's commentary notes that it is based in
part on the existing GIS statutes in Florida, Kentucky, Utah, and Virginia.
Other state statutory provisions dealing with GIS include those passed in
Arizona, Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-172 (2000), ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-21-501 (2000), MINN.
STAT. § 4A.05 (1999), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-C:3 (1999), and WIS. STAT. §§
16.966-16.967 (1999). In July 1997, New York state issued Technology Policy 97-
6, which created the NYS GIS Data Sharing Cooperative that "encourages public
agencies to share in the creation, use, and maintenance of GIS datasets... while
providing citizens, the media, and other data users easy access to this resource."
James Natoli, Director of State Operations, Governor's Task Force on
Information Resource Management, Technology Policy 97-6 (July 17, 1997),
http://www.oft.state.ny.us/policy/tp-976.htm.
[Vol. 30:55
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to September 11, 2001, the debate over the accessibility of GIS
data focused on an argument by some in government that the data
should not be subject to freedom of information laws primarily
because the government was concerned that data collected at the
public's expense would be put to private commercial use without
adequate compensation back to the government.36 Post-September
11th, federal and state governments appear to be cloaking their
reluctance to share certain GIS data by using homeland security
as a justification to promote secrecy. In an effort to provide
guidance on access to spatial data, the National States Geographic
Information Council developed a decision tree to help its members
judge whether data should be accessible to the public.37
A. GIS Information Sharing Policies at the Federal and State
Levels
Noting the critical importance of geographic information in
"promot[ing] economic development, improving stewardship of
natural resources and protecting the environment, 3 s President
Clinton issued an Executive Order in 1994 to coordinate geo-
graphic data acquisition and access through a coordinated
National Spatial Data Infrastructure ("NSDI").39 "The NSDI
assures that spatial data from multiple sources ([all levels of
government], academia, and the private sector) are available and
easily integrated."4 ° Among the values NSDI must honor are
36 See, e.g., H. Bishop Dansby, Commentary: Selling Public GIS Data, 1 GISLAw,
no. 4, 18 (1993).
" See National States Geographic Information Council, Data Access Decision
Tree for Critical Infrastructure Data, July 8, 2002, http://www.nsgic.org/
committees/documents/080702_HSDecisionTreeCIData%20_Version7.ppt.
3 The NDSI was created at the recommendation of the National Performance
Review. Exec. Order No. 12,906, 59 Fed. Reg. 17,671 (Apr. 11, 1994).
39 Id.
40 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRC. No. A-16 Revised § 2 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars/a016/a016_rev.html [hereinafter OMB Circular A-16] (providing
direction for federal agencies in their maintenance and use of geographic and
spatial data); see also id. §§ 2b(1-6) (listing the components of the NSDI,
2005]
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"[a]ccess for all citizens to spatial data, information, and interpre-
tive products,"'" and the "[iinteroperability of federal information
systems,"42 to enable sharing of resources across agency lines.4"
Policies developed by the NSDI are applicable to "[a]ll spatial data
and geographic information systems activities-financed directly or
indirectly, in whole or in part, by federal funds."" One possibly
significant limitation on the public access theme is the requirement
particularly "data themes," which are defined as "electronic records and
coordinates for a topic or subject, such as elevation or vegetation;" "metadata,"
which is defined as "information about and/or geospatial services, such as
content, source, vintage, spatial scale, accuracy, projection, responsible party,
contact phone number, method of collection, and other descriptions;" the
National Spatial Data Clearinghouse which provides access to"[a]ll spatial data
collected by federal agencies or their agents;" standards, which include the
"standards and protocols for data development, documentation, exchange, and
geospatial services" and provide that "[n]o federal funds will be used.., for the
development of spatial data not complying with NSDI standards;" and
"partnerships" that can occur "among federal, tribal, state, local government, and
academic institutions... [the] private sector.., and other business information
providers and users").
41 Id. § 2a.
42 id.
41 Id. OMB Circular A- 16 further directs that "international compatibility is an
important part of the NSDI." To meet this goal, "[flederal agencies will develop
their international spatial data in compliance with international voluntary
consensus standards... ." Id.
41 Id. § 6a. The following examples are not meant to be exhaustive, and
additional programs may be added at any time, but OMB Circular A- 16 indicates
that the programs and initiatives covered under its requirements include
[t]he National Mapping Program, the National Spatial Reference
System, the National Geologic Mapping Program, the National
Wetlands Inventory, the National Cooperative Soil Survey
Program, the National Public Land Survey System, Geographic
Coordinate Database, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) nautical charting and nautical data
collection and information programs, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) inland waterway charting program ...
FEMA's Flood Plain Mapping program and other federal
activities that involve national surveying, mapping, remove
sensing, spatially referenced statistical data, and... [GPS].
[Vol. 30:55
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that "[t]he NSDI supports and advances the building of a Global
Spatial Data Infrastructure, consistent with national security,
national defense, [and] national intelligence...."" Executive Order
12,906, as reiterated in OMB Circular A-16, specifically exempts
from the requirements of the NSDI
[c]lassified national security-related spatial data
activities of the Department of Defense... as specifi-
cally determined by the Secretary of Defense . . .
activities of the Department of Energy, as specifically
determined by the Secretary of Energy . . . [and]
[i]ntelligence spatial data activities, as specifically
determined by the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
4 6
The FGDC, chaired by the Secretary of the Interior and staffed by
the Department of the Interior, is the central "interagency
coordinating body for NSDI-related activities."4 7 All federal
agencies that collect, use or disseminate geographic information
either internally or through activities involving partners, grants,
or contracts, are required to, among other things, publish a
45Id. § 2a. The Circular further charges the Federal Geographic Data Committee
("FGDC") with ensuring "consistency of the NSDI with national security,
national defense, and emergency preparedness program policies regarding data
accessibility." Id. § 8e(g).
46 OMB Circular A-16, supra note 40, §§ 7(2), (3).
41 Id. § 1. The Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget is
charged with serving as Vice-Chair of the FGDC, and all agencies responsible for
spatial data themes are required to participate as members of the FGDC. Id.
§ 4a. As of August 2002, these agencies include: Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, Interior, Justice, State, Transportation; the Environmental
Protection Agency; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the General
Services Administration; Library of Congress; National Archives and Records
Administration; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; National
Science Foundation; and the Tennessee Valley Authority. OMB Circular A-16,
supra note 40, at App. B.
20051
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strategy for advancing geographic information and spatial data
activities in support of the NSDI Strategy.4"
The E-Government Act of 2002 ("EGA") 49 reiterates the
importance of the collaborative development and use of common
protocols for government-sponsored GIS.5 As a policy acknowledg-
ment that some GIS data is not shared, the EGA directs that,
among other things, common protocols are to "maximize the degree
to which unclassified geographic information from various sources
can be made electronically compatible and accessible. '' 51 The EGA
further mandates that all federal agencies shall conduct risk
assessments and analyses for their various electronic information
systems in order to ascertain the potential "harm that could result
from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modifica-
tion, or destruction of such information or information systems. 52
A recent report published by the RAND Corporation that
addressed public availability of geospatial information about
critical sites 3 identified "465 [sample data sources representing
various federal] programs, offices, or major initiatives at [thirty]
different federal agencies and departments, 54 but "fewer than [six]
percent of [these sites] appeared as though they could be useful to
a potential attacker. 5 5 Further, "[f]ewer than [one] percent of the
... datasets .. examined appeared both potentially useful and
unique.' '56 RAND asserts that a combination of usefulness and
41 See id.49 H.R. 2458, 107th Cong. (2002), § 216(f) (enacted) (authorizing funding through
2007 "[t]o enhance the management and promotion of electronic Government
services").
50 Id.
" Id. § 216(e)(1). Further, the EGA provides that protocols should be developed
to achieve "interoperable" GIS technologies that will allow low-cost and
widespread sharing of data across different levels of government and the public.
See id. § 216(e)(2).
52 Id. § 3544(a)(2)(A).
53 BAKER ET AL., supra note 20, at xxv.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at xxv, n.2 (noting that since September 11, 2001, this information is "no
longer being made public by federal agencies," as the data has "either been
[Vol. 30:55
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uniqueness is the appropriate determinant of whether particular
geospatial data presents a significant homeland -security risk.57
Ultimately, the report found that potential attackers have a wide
array of avenues through which they can obtain the information
required to attack locations within the United States. As a result,
"publicly accessible geospatial information is probably not the first
choice for fulfilling these needs.""8 The report suggests a distinction
between information that can be absolutely necessary to a
potential attacker, information that is only moderately useful, and
information that is not at all essential.59 The RAND report also
sets forth four recommendations for the federal government's
development of a comprehensive plan for the treatment of sensitive
geospatial data, including (1) that "the federal government should
play a proactive role in bringing greater coherence and consistency
to assessing the homeland security implications of publicly
available geospatial information; '60 (2) that "[a] n analytical process
should be used . . . to assess the potential homeland security
sensitivity"'" of certain geospatial data; (3) that a longer term
"comprehensive model for addressing the security of geospatial
information" be developed; 62 and (4) that "the federal government
should increase the awareness of the public and private sectors
concerning the potential sensitivity of geospatial information." 3
completely withdrawn from public access on the World Wide Web or their
agencies have implemented password protection to control access").
17 Id. at xxiii.
" Id. at xxi. While geospatial data does have the potential to be useful, potential
attackers are more likely to obtain information via direct access or observation
to better suit their information needs. Id. at xxii. The report notes, however, that
"we cannot conclude that publicly accessible federal geospatial information
provides no special benefit to the attacker. Neither can we conclude that it would
benefit the attacker." Id. at xxv-xxvi.
5 Id. at xxii.60Id. at xxxi.
61 Id.
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State and local governments rely on federally-developed GIS
datasets for their own GIS sharing programs.64 In some cases,
participant agreements between various governments provide that
any records of participating governments that are classified as
private or protected from public access are not to be provided to
other governments in the GIS cooperative. 5 These types of
agreements, however, may not withstand scrutiny under public
access laws in all states. Questions also remain as to who actually
owns the data once it is in the possession of governmental entities.
The Minnesota Governor's Council on Geographic Information
reaffirmed its belief that "the public benefits when governments
leverage investments in geospatial data and make it widely
available-both to other government units and to the public ....
[T]he council views geographic information as a public resource
that should be widely shared and used."6
A January 2002 GIS Needs Assessment and Implementation
Plan for the State of Maine acknowledged that "[i]n light of general
concerns about.., homeland security.., protection of privacy will
64 See, e.g., North Dakota Geographic Information Systems, http://www.state.nd.
us/gis/resources (follow "GIS Activities," "GIS Standards" or "GIS Training"
hyperlinks for referenced links to federal materials) (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
65 See, e.g., Draft Oregon Digital Spatial Data Sharing and Integration
Agreement, State of Oregon and Signatory State and Federal Agencies § 7,
http://egov.oregon.gov/DAS/IRMD/GEO/ogic/docs/IGA-NovO4.pdf (last visited
Nov. 15, 2005).
Records of the State or its political subdivisions that are
classified as private, controlled, or protected under the
provisions of Oregon law shall not be provided pursuant to this
agreement, unless otherwise available pursuant to Oregon law.
Similarly, federal records exempt from release under the
provision of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), or
confidential or proprietary, shall not be provided pursuant to
this agreement, unless discretionary authority exists for the
exemption.
Id.66 MINN. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, MAKING THE MOST
OF GEOSPATIAL DATA EXCHANGE: A GUIDE FOR DATA DISTRIBUTION (2003),
available at http://www.gis.state.mn.us/pdf/GeoDataExchange.pdf.
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need to be addressed without undermining the intent of freedom
of information statutes."67
B. GIS Can Be an Ally in Promoting Homeland Security
While governments have been focused on the removal of,
and restrictions to, certain GIS data because of security concerns,
the fact remains that governments are relying on the promise of
GIS technology to assist in overcoming homeland security chal-
lenges. For example, the GIS Task Force in North Dakota received
funding from the Department of Homeland Security to work with
the State 911 Association and the Division of Emergency Manage-
ment on a project to create accurate road centerline information.6 s
Numerous other examples exist of how GIS is being used across
the country as a critical tool which enables governments to prevent
and prepare for potential environmental hazards.69 The FGDC
commented that GIS is a valuable tool to assist governments and
the public with significant aspects of homeland security including
detection, preparedness, prevention, protection, response, and
recovery.7 ° When the government significantly restricts public
access to important GIS information, however, the public loses the
67 APPLIED GEOGRAPHICS, MAINE RESOLVE 23 GIS NEEDS ASSESSMENT &
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 20 (2002), available at http://apollo.ogis.state.me.us/sc/
final/FinalReport/pdf/Section2.pdf.
68 See Current Status March 15, 2004, North Dakota Geographic Information
Systems (2004), http://www.state.nd.us/gis/about/status (follow 'March 15,2004"
hyperlink).
69 On their website, the FGDC provides several examples of how GIS is being
used across the country as a critical tool which enables governments to plan and
prepare for potential environmental hazards, including the coordinated
application and use of geospatial data in New York City in response and recovery
operations following the World Trade Center attack, the development of
geospatial data as a foundation for critical infrastructure protection and
emergency preparedness and response in the greater Chicago area, and the use
of geospatial information to combat and suppress wildfires in the western United
States. Homeland Security and Geographic Information Systems, Federal
Geographic Data Committee, available at http://www.fgdc.gov/publications/
homeland.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
70 Id.
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benefit of being able to plan for any number of potential disasters-
whether terrorist activity or another unexpected disaster.
II. PUBLIC ACCESS TO GIS DATA AND HOMELAND SECURITY
Just as some believed that the early policies and procedures
of the Bush Administration would have a "far-reaching impact on
federal information access,"'" the events of September 11, 2001,
have led to a rapid growth of "information curtailment. 7 2 Com-
mentators note a far greater commitment to government secrecy
now than at any other time since World War II." Similarly, some
comentators question whether the lack of access to public informa-
tion is based on enhanced security needs or whether it is a case of
simple opportunism.74 In some cases, government restrictions on
public access are being promoted by industry groups based on their
self-interested views of critical infrastructure protection.7 5
71 R. SEAN EVANS & BRAD VOGUS, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ACCESS
IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 (2002), available at http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/-rse/Federal
Access.htm.
72 Id.
7' Laura Parker, Kevin Johnson & Toni Locy, Secure Often Means Secret Post-
9/11, USA TODAY, May 16, 2002, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
usatonline/20020516/4116384s.htm.
7" Id. To be fair, however, even prior to September 11, 2001, the federal
government had removed certain spatial data from public access by the military
and by Congress (e.g., U.S.G.S. removed cave entrances from topographical maps
and information about certain gravesites and archeological sites); see also
Zellmer, supra note 21; Christopher H. Schmitt & Edward T. Pound, Keeping
Secrets, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 2003, at 18, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031222/22secrecy.htm.
For the past three years, the Bush administration has quietly
but efficiently dropped a shroud of secrecy across many critical
operations of the federal government--cloaking its own affairs
from scrutiny and removing from the public domain important
information on health, safety, and environmental matters...
Bush administration officials often cite the September 11
attacks as the reason for the enhanced secrecy.
Id.
" See, e.g., ASS'N OF METRO. WATER AGENCIES, STATE FOIA LAWS: A GUIDE To
PROTECTING SENSITIVE WATER SECURITY INFORMATION (2002), available at
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On October 12, 2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
issued a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") Memorandum to all
federal department and agency heads superceding the Department
of Justice policy memorandum which had been in effect since
1993.76 The memorandum calls for a greater degree of agency
deliberation when confronted with requests for information.
I encourage your agency to carefully consider the
protection of all such values and interests when
making disclosure determinations under the FOIA.
Any discretionary decision by your agency to disclose
information protected under the FOIA should be
made only after-full and deliberate consideration of
the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy
interests that could be implicated by disclosure of the
information.
http://www.amwa.net/security/FOIA.pdf. Executive Director Diane VanDe Hei
states that the publication is intended to offer strategies to advocates of
amending state statutes so that they provide for FOIA exemptions excluding
information from disclosure. The Executive Summary asserts that "transparency
in government [through public access laws] exacts a cost. Open access to
vulnerability and risk assessments, for example, provides nefarious elements
with a road map for attacking the safe, secure, and reliable supply of services
from utilities." Id. at Forward (PDF Document at 4).
76 Memorandum from Att'y Gen. Ashcroft to Heads of all Fed. Dep'ts and
Agencies (Oct. 12,2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001foia
postl9.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 2001 FOIA Memorandum].
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") is charged with overseeing agency
compliance with the FOIA, and the DOJ serves as the primary source of FOIA
guidance for all agencies. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT UPDATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELECTRONIC FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT AMENDMENTS (2002), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d02493.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter INFO. MGMT.
UPDATE]. According to the INFO. MGMT. UPDATE, "[t]he 1993 Attorney General
memorandum established an overall 'presumption of disclosure' and promoted
discretion (when an exemption might otherwise be used to withhold information)
to achieve 'maximum responsible disclosure' under FOIA." Id. at 10.
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In making these decisions, you should consult with
the Department of Justice's Office of Information and
Privacy when significant FOIA issues arise, as well
as with our Civil Division on FOIA litigation
matters.7 7
The memorandum adds that when agencies "decide to withhold
records, in whole or in part,"78 based upon a FOIA request, "the
Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack
a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse
impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important
records., 79 This new "sound legal basis" standard replaced the
"foreseeable harm"' standard, which was employed under
Attorney General Janet Reno's 1993 predecessor memorandum."1
It is believed that the statements contained in this new policy not
only "reflect a desire to provide a higher degree of security to
17 2001 FOIA Memorandum, supra note 76.
78 Id.
71 Id. In response to the 2001 FOIA Memorandum, Senator Patrick Leahy sent
a letter to the then-Government Accounting Office ("GAO," now the Government
Accountability Office) requesting that they assess the effect of these policy
changes on FOIA requests. Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
Senate Judiciary Comm. to the Hon. David Walker, Comptroller General, U.S.
General Accounting Office (Feb. 28, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/congress/2002/leahy-gao.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). The GAO issued
its report in August of 2002, which found a difference in views between FOIA
officials and the requestor community about the impacts of September 11th on
public disclosure. Subsequent GOA reports found, among other things, that
government-wide backlogs in responding to FOIA requests were both substantial
and growing. 2001 FOIA Memorandum, supra note 75; see also HOMEFRONT
CONFIDENTIAL: HOW THE WAR ON TERRORISM AFFECTS ACCESS TO INFORMATION
AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW, (Lucy A. Dalglish & Gregg P. Leslie eds.
2004), available at http://www.rcfp.org/homefrontconfidential/Homefront_
Confidential_5th.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter HOMEFRONT
CONFIDENTIAL].
'0 2001 FOIA Memorandum, supra note 76.
81 Id.; see also HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL, supra note 79 at 61-62 (noting that,
with respect to the Ashcroft memo, "[t]he new instruction canceled and replaced
a pro-disclosure directive issued in 1993 by then-Attorney General Janet Reno
... who openly endorsed disclosures of government information").
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sensitive information, but just as likely... [signal] that agencies
are being encouraged to be unresponsive to FOIA requests." 2 The
Office of Information Privacy within the Department of Justice
"followed up on the [Ashcroft memo] with guidance focusing on
protection of sensitive material pertaining to vulnerability
assessments, safeguard circumventions, and critical infrastructure
protections."83
GIS industry leaders commented that the government
rapidly moved in the opposite direction from its pre-September 11,
2001, "open-access society," 4 with sites and links being closed
temporarily and permanently.8 5 While in some cases the removed
information was more likely excessive than actually useful, 6 in
other situations the removal of certain geospatial data could
hamper emergency response efforts. 7 It is estimated that "since...
Sept. 11 ... [h]undreds of thousands of public documents have been
removed from government Web sites,"88 including previously
82 EVANs & VOGUS, supra note 71, at 4.
83 INFO. MGMT. UPDATE, supra note 76, at 11. The report notes that following
September 11, 2001, the Information Security Oversight Office within the
National Archives and Records Administration, and the Office of Information
Privacy within the DOJ "developed additional guidance for reviewing
government information regarding.., homeland security and public safety...
[by protecting] classified information, previously unclassified or declassified
information, and sensitive but unclassified information." Id. at 11-12.
84 DATA SECURITY: LOOSE BITS SINK SHIPS, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Jan.
28,2002, available at http://enr.construction.com/news/informationtech/archives/
020128d.asp.
85 See id. Ann Johnson, higher education solutions manager with industry leader
Environmental Systems Research Institute ("ESRI"), noted that "[i] mmediately
after the attacks, favorite sites on the Internet were closed. Some sites closed
pages and links and some were ordered to scrub and even destroy certain
assets." Id.
86 For example, the Federal Aviation Administration's web site used to provide
"altitude and coordinate information in real-time for airplanes in flight." Id.
87 See, e.g., id. (noting that by "limiting access to differential GPS data or traffic
information" posted by the Federal Highway Administration, for example, could
pose "significant issues in many areas for emergency response and construction
planning and control people").
' Parker, Johnson & Locy, supra note 73, at 1A. The reporters note that in
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available GIS data. The FGDC acknowledges that "[a] great deal
of our Nation's success can be attributed to its openness. Access to
information has always been readily available to the American
public and they recognize that some risk is acceptable." 9 Prior to
September 11th, it was widely accepted and understood that
government would make GIS databases accessible to the public.9 °
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ("HSA") created the
position of privacy officer within the Department of Homeland
Security to assist with the protection of certain information viewed
by the government as confidential.9' When non-governmental
parties voluntarily provide information to the government for use
"regarding the security of critical infrastructure and protected
systems,"92 the HSA requires that the information be permanently
exempt from public disclosure,93 denying the public the ability to
challenge the veracity of the information and to know what data
the government relies upon in its decision-making. Furthermore,
even assuming that in the short term there could be a credible
need to justify the withholding of critical security information, it
is unlikely that it would be subsequently justified to withhold it as
permanently classified information just because the provider of the
information requested it to be kept private. Despite this pro-
privacy bent, other sections of the HSA, such as the Homeland
Security Information Sharing Act, acknowledge that even for
government to successfully do its intended job under the Act, there
is a need for not just federal intra-agency sharing of information,
but for intergovernmental sharing among the federal, state, and
addition to information that was removed from the sites, other information was
edited and access to some information was made more difficult. Id.
9 Federal Geographic Data Committee, GUIDELINES FOR PROVIDING APPROPRIATE
ACCESS TO GEOSPATIAL DATA IN RESPONSE TO SECURITY CONCERNS (2005),
available at http://www.fgdc.gov/fgdc/homeland/access-guidelines.pdf [herein-
after GEOSPATIAL GUIDELINES].
9 See, e.g., Harlan J. Onsrud, In Support of Open Access for Publicly Held
Geographic Information, 1 GIS LAW, no. 1, 3 (1992).
91 H.R. 5005, 106th Cong. § 222 (2002) (enacted).
92 Id. § 214.
93 Id.
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local governments. 94 The Act acknowledges that "[s]ome homeland
security information is needed by the State and local personnel to
prevent and prepare for terrorist attack[s]"95 and that these needs
"must be reconciled with the need to preserve the protected status
of such information. ,,9" Some of the data included is clearly not
only important to governments, but also to citizens in communities
that could benefit from information regarding potential environ-
mental targets and hazards in their vicinity, as well as information
about various disaster mitigation and security plans.
On March 25, 2003, President Bush issued Executive Order
13,292 (the "Order") amending a prior Executive Order that dealt
with classified national security information. 97 The Order first
acknowledges that the Country's democratic ideals "require that
the American people be informed of the activities of their Govern-
ment""8 and that "our Nation's progress depends on the free flow
of information"9 9 to its people. Nevertheless, the Order states that
"the national defense has required that certain information be
maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our
democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interac-
tions with foreign nations."'100 Reiterating that the protection of
"information critical to our Nation's security remains a priority," ''
the President established within the National Archives an
Information Security Oversight Office which shall, among other
things, "develop directives for the implementation of this order;
oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this order and
its implementing directives; review and approve agency imple-
menting regulations and agency guides... [and] convene and chair
interagency meetings to discuss matters pertaining to the program
94 See id. § 891.
95 Id. § 891(b)(4).
96 Id. § 891(b)(5).
" Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003) (amending
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established by this order."' 2 The Order also put into place a revised
process for classifying and declassifying information. 103
A. Changes in Geospatial Access After September 11, 2001
After September 11, 2001, government officials were forced
"to make decisions about restricting ... access"10 4 to geospatial
data under "time pressures,"'15 with little "top-level guidance."'0 6
One chronology of disappearing government information post-
September 11, 2001,107 documents dozens of instances of federal
government agencies shutting down or restricting public access to
information on their web sites.0 ' For example, the Department of
102 Id. at 15,327.
'03 Exec. Order 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. at 15,328.
1o4 BAKER ET AL., supra note 20, at xviii.
105 Id.
106 Id.; see also Right-To-Know after September 11th: Hearings Before the H.
Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Water Resources and
Environment, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://www.house.gov/trans
portationlwater/11-08-01/11-08-Olmemo.htm. In explaining the purpose of the
hearings, the Committee Hearing Report stated that
[flollowing September 11, there have been concerns that some
information that has been publicly available and widely
disseminated may decrease domestic security. On October 2,
2001, the American Water Works Association, representing the
water supply community, wrote a letter to President Bush
urging "Congress and federal agencies to carefully re-think an
appropriate balance between our communities' right-to-know
and domestic security." On October 3, 2001, the American
Chemistry Council wrote to EPA Administrator Whitman to ask
that EPA revisit its policies on the public availability of some
industry data. "Specifically, we encourage you to take immediate
action to temporarily prevent access to off-site consequence
analysis (OCA) data as part of the Agency's Risk Management
Plan."
Id.
107 Barbara Miller, Chronology of Disappearing Government Information Data
Collected Through October 31, 2002, http://tigger.uic.edu/-aquinn/access/chr.
html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
108 Id.
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Transportation removed pipeline mapping information from its
web site, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission withdrew a map
of more than 100 active commercial nuclear reactors.° 9 In addition
to Internet-based information, the Government Printing Office
withdrew access to approximately fifty titles including a CD-ROM
produced by the U.S. Geological Survey entitled Source-Area
Characteristics of Large Public Surface-Water Supplies in the
Conterminous United States: An Information Resource for Source-
Water Assessment. 110
The government has also taken a keen interest in maps and
other data assembled by non-government personnel. For example,
an architect who created a web site "featuring aerial pictures of
nuclear weapons storage areas, military bases, ports, dams and
secret government bunkers ... [was] contacted by the FBI" about
the site."' Even a graduate student found his work subject to
government scrutiny and classification for mapping the network of
fiber-optic cabling throughout the country's business sectors to
satisfy his dissertation requirements." 2 In the latter example, the
private sector was just as interested in the information as was the
government." 3 The work was described by one Department of
Homeland Security official as "a cookbook of how to exploit the
vulnerabilities of our nation's infrastructure.""' 4 The government's
109 Seigel, supra note 22, at 340.
"1 EVANS & VOGUS, supra note 71 (citing 1999 U.S.G.S. Open-File Rpt. 99-248).
1 Laura Blumenfeld, Dissertation Could Be Security Threat: Student's Maps
Illustrate Concerns About Public Information, WASH. POST, Jul. 8, 2003, at Al
(available from LexisNexis; on file with the William & Mary Environmental Law
& Policy Review).
112 Id.
"' Id. When the student presented his findings to the Chief Information Officers
of the country's largest financial services companies, the executives "were
'amazed' and 'concerned' to see how interdependent their [communication]
systems were," leading them to "plan to simulate a cyber assault and a bomb
attack jointly with the telecommunications industry and the National
Communications System to measure the impact on financial services." Id. at A6.
114 Id. at A6-A7 (internal quotation marks omitted). Brenton Greene, Director for
Infrastructure Coordination at the Department of Homeland Security, applauded
the student project, maintaining that it should not be "openly distributed." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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intense interest in this type of data most likely stems in part from
Osama bin Laden's videotaped message of December 2001 urging
the destruction of the United States' economy." 5
In New York, the Director of the newly-created Office of
Public Security issued a confidential memorandum to agency
heads and commissioners in January 2002, expressing concern
about "a disconcerting amount of potentially compromising
information still publicly accessible,""' 6 and requiring each agency
to, among other things, "conduct a review of all sensitive informa-
tion made available to individuals [and] the public via the agency's
Internet site""' 7 and "via freedom of information [law]""' 8 requests.
1. Removal of GIS Data
Not long ago, the media documented intentional blurring of
some of the U.S. Geological Survey's "highest-quality aerial
photographs of [landmarks in] Washington, D.C.," 119 thereby
demonstrating the realization of fears about government-limited
access to satellite and aerial photography. Ironically, many similar
photographs already exist both on and off the Internet, raising
serious questions over the effectiveness of such an action. For
many analogous reasons, the government's removal of significant
GIS data and other information from the Internet may not be
achieving intended results. For example, advocacy groups often
download databases and post them on non-governmental web sites,
115 Id. at A6.
6 Confidential Memorandum from James K. Kallstrom, Director, Office of
Public Security, & James G. Natoli, Office of State Operations, to Agency Heads




11' U.S. Blurs White House, Other Landmarks in Aerial Photos, USATODAY, Dec.
24, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-12-24-
blurring-wash-x.htm (noting that the federal government's motivation is "to
hide objects in plain view" on the "roofs of the White House, [and] Capitol
and Treasury Department," as well as obscuref aerial "views of the Naval
Observatory Compound where Vice President Dick Cheney lives").
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allowing the information to be easily accessible to its members and
to the public as a whole. These examples demonstrate "the tension
that exists between the public's right to know and security con-
cerns."'
120
The Bureau of Transportation Statistics removed most
publicly accessed GIS data from its web site post-September 11,
2001, explaining that the action enabled the agency to "reevaluate
the content available through [its] webpages. '121 The web pages are
now back on-line, presumably with modifications. 122 "The Depart-
ment of Energy ("DOE") removed detailed maps and descriptions
often nuclear facilities with weapons-grade plutonium and highly-
enriched uranium from its website.' 23 Similarly, "[t]he Interna-
tional Nuclear Safety Center removed interactive maps [of nuclear
plants] from its website."'24 "OMB Watch submitted a FOIA...
120 Id. (quoting James Dempsey of the Center for Democracy and Technology)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
121 See Access to Government Information Post September 11th, OMB Watch,
Feb. 1, 2002, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleprint/213/-1/1 [hereinafter
Information Post-September 11th]; see also Post 9/11 Age of Missing Information,
Clary-Meuser Research Network, http://www.mapcruzin.com/news/rtkpost 911.
htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
The site is a national resource for transportation spatial data
and GIS in transportation information. One activist noted that
the web site previously indicated that the agency was reviewing
the site for security reasons.... In response to an email question
about why the information was unavailable and when it will
return, we received the following: "Due to the attacks on
September 11th, BTS [(Bureau of Transportation Statistics)]
and all other government agencies have had to reevaluate the
content available through our web pages. We do not yet know if
this data will be available in the future or if we will permanently
offer it only to federal, state and local officials."
Id.
122 See Geographic Information Services, Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
http://www.bts.gov/externallinks/state-gis-resources.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2005).
123 See Information Post-September 11th, supra note 121.
124 Id. ("These maps allow users to click on a location of a nuclear power plant to
learn more about it."). The article says the interactive maps referred to in the
article were later restored.
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request to the Department of Energy (and other agencies) asking
what information it removed from its website and what guidelines,
if any, were followed to remove the information."'25 Immediately
following the September 11, 2001, attacks, "[t]he National Imagery
and Mapping Agency blocked access to a wide range of its publicly
available maps.., while officials reviewed the maps to make sure
they did not contain information that could jeopardize national
security.' 1 26 The U.S. Air Force base in Tullahoma, Tennessee,
reportedly "asked the state to stop taking detailed aerial photo-
graphs"'127 that Tennessee was using to create its GIS.
2. Official Changes in State-Level Policy
Some believe piecemeal amendments to "Freedom of
Information laws to reflect technological advances, '"128 including
GIS, are both controversial and unlikely to succeed. 129 The fact
remains, however, that legislative proposals to expand exemptions
have been introduced8 ° and passed in "[m]ore than half [of] the
125 Id.
121 Jason Peckenpaugh, Mapping agency blocks access, postpones outsourcing
pact, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Sept. 25, 2001, available at http://www.govexec.com/
dailyfed/0901/092501pl.htm. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency
("NIMA") "handles mapping and imaging services for the Defense Department
and intelligence agencies." Id. While the agency did make most of the maps
available shortly after the restriction, maps of U.S. military installations were
withheld. Further, "[o]ne intelligence expert questioned the wisdom of [NIMA's]
freeze, noting that since NIMA is not the only source of map information,
restricting access ... will not improve security." Id.
127 Homefront Confidential, A Chronology of Events, http://www.rcfp.org/
homefrontconfidentiallchronology.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
12' Neil Vigdor, Potential Release of GIS Data Involves 'Serious Privacy and
Security Issues,' GREENWICHTIME.COM, Nov. 2,2002, http://www.mapcruzin.com/
news/rtkll0802a.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (referring to the State of
Connecticut situation discussed infra).
129 Id.
13o See Parker, Johnson & Locy, supra note 73. According to this post-September
11th news account, "[I]awmakers in 18 states [as of 2002, were] examining or
[had] passed plans to give local officials more power to shield information." Id.
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states"'' since September 11th. In Arkansas, for example, a new
law cited security concerns in amending "the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act of 1967 to provide exemptions for certain records and
meetings concerning public water systems.'"132 According to one
news account, after a county clerk in Iowa received "an unusual
request for aerial photographs of a site that includes an Army
munitions plant,"'33 the legislature approved an effort to classify
"architectural drawings for schools, public utilities, airports and
some local government buildings."'34
In their 2004 Annual Report, the North Carolina Geographic
Information Coordinating Council ("NCGICC") included an
appendix listing statutorily restricted data from the statewide GIS
site based on confidentiality or security concerns.'35 The Council
131 Michael Mariani, A Little Less Sunshine, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, June 2004,
available at http://governing.com/archive/2004/jun/foia.txt.
132 Act of Mar. 3, 2003, 2003 Ark. Acts 2487 (expired July 1, 2005), available at
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us (follow "Research Resources" hyperlink; then
follow "Acts and Bills of Previous Legislative Sessions" hyperlink; then follow
"2003 Regular Session Acts" hyperlink; then follow "Search Acts for Specific text"
hyperlink; search for "763" under "Act Number"; follow first search result
"ACT763") (providing for FOIA exemptions for records and meetings of the public
water systems). The Act, which expired on July 1, 2005, specifically exempts
(15)(A) Records, including analyses, investigations, studies,
reports, recommendations, requests for proposals, drawings,
diagrams, blueprints, and plans, containing information relating
to security for any public water system.
(B) The records shall include:
(i) Risk and vulnerability assessments;
(ii) Plans and proposals for preventing and mitigating security
risks;
(iii) Emergency response and recovery records;
(iv) Security plans and procedures; and
(v) Any other records containing information that, if disclosed,
might jeopardize or compromise efforts to secure and protect the
public water system.
Id. at § 2.
133 Parker, Johnson & Locy, supra note 73 at IA.
134 Id.
135 NORTH CAROLINA GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION COORDINATING COUNCIL, 2004
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL
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noted that, "without statutory authority some local governments
were making decisions at a technical level to remove certain data
sets from their Internet web services because of concerns about
terrorism, thus depriving public access."'36
A number of states passed new laws that exempt certain
information from public access. While most of these statutes do not
specifically reference GIS data, the language is broad enough to
cover the exempted information in any format, including a geo-
spatial representation of the information. For example, since May
2004, a new Alabama law exempts from disclosure information
that relates to "security plans, procedures or other security-related
information."'37 A 2003 Arizona law "prohibits public disclosure of
information about drinking water systems.' 38 A 2004 California
law seeks to increase public security by exempting from disclosure
information about government efforts to combat security threats,
including any information related to facility security that "could be
used to aid a potential terrorist . . . attack.' 39 Similarly, in
Georgia, a 2003 law exempts from disclosure "'any plan, blue print
[sic], or other material' that, if made public, would compromise
security."' 4° A new Kansas law "exempts from disclosure records
that 'pose a substantial likelihood of revealing security measures'
ASSEMBLY 18-19 (2004), available at http://cgia.cgia.state.nc.us/gicc/annrep/
annrep2004.pdf. The NCGICC effects cooperation among agencies and the
private sector through its thirty-five member council comprised of General
Assembly and Governor appointees, state governmental officials, and GIS user
committee-elected representatives. Information restricted based on security
concerns includes emergency response plans by "[1]ocal [b]oards of [e]ducation
... [c]ommunity [c]olleges... University of North Carolina campuses... [p]ublic
[h]ospitals... [i]nformation technology systems, telecommunications networks,
electronic security systems... [and] [s]ensitive [p]ublic [s]ecurity [i]nformation
... [including] details of public security plans and arrangements, or the detailed
plans and drawings of public buildings and infrastructure facilit[ies] ...... Id.
136 Id. at 4. The council correctly notes that "[t]he larger issue is to determine
which data might be 'useful' to a potential terrorist." Id.
137 HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL, supra note 79, at 79.
131 Id. at 79.
131 Id. at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted).14 0Id. at 82.
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that protect utility, sewer treatment, water and communications
systems from criminal terrorism."'' Another sweeping exemption
enacted by Maryland in 2002 authorizes "a custodian to deny
access to a public record if access would endanger the public."'142 A
2002 Illinois law specifically exempts GIS data from the state's
Freedom of Information Law.
143
The Connecticut legislature entertained, but did not enact,
a proposal that would have authorized the division heads of any
state agency to "exempt from disclosure any records that they have
'reasonable grounds to believe may result in a safety risk. 1 44 In
2003, a Connecticut public hearing discussed legislation affecting
GIS data, but the proposal received no further action.
145
Voters in Florida amended the state constitution in 2003 to
require that any further exemptions from state public access laws
require a two-thirds majority in each chamber of the legislature,
making it more difficult to further restrict the public's right to
know. 4 ' California voters in 2004 passed Proposition 59, which
"creat[ed] a constitutional right for [the] public to access govern-
ment information."'147 In Missouri, a 2004 amendment to the
Open Records Law granted "the public broad access to electronic
records ... 148
3. Federal Geographic Data Committee Offers Interim
Guidelines
In September 2004, the FGDC issued interim guidelines
for providing access to geospatial data in response to security
141 Id. at 83.
142 Id. at 84.
14 HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL, supra note 79, at 83.
144 Id. at 80.
145 Id. at 81.
146 Id. at 82.
147 See Propositions: Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, California General
Election, Official Voter Information Guide (2004), http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/
voterguide/english.pdf.
148 HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL, supra note 79, at 86.
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concerns.' 49 Acknowledging that "there is not much publicly
available geospatial information that is sensitive,"' ° and relying
in part on the 2004 study by the RAND Corporation, 5 ' the FGDC
guidelines attempt to strike a balance between the public's right
to access government information and the protection of homeland
security. 52 Among the guiding principles, the FGDC included the
need to "[p]rovide for the free flow of information between the
government and the public essential to a democratic society,"'
53
and stated that this information sharing "enables both informed
public participation in decision-making and private reuse of
government information."'
154
In determining whether certain geospatial data needs to be
safeguarded, the FGDC recommends that the agency consider the
following factors in making a "user needs assessment" (1) whether
the data is "useful for selecting one or more specific potential
targets, and/or for planning and executing an attack on a potential
target"155 and (2) whether the information is unique to the data
requested. 56 To determine whether the data might be used in
planning and executing an attack, the guidelines suggest that the
decision-maker consider whether "knowledge of the location and
purpose of a feature, as described by the data, have the potential to
significantly compromise the security of persons, property, or
systems"' 57 and whether the data identifies "specific features that
149 GEOSPATIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 89. The guidelines were issued pursuant
to OMB Circular A- 16, which authorized the FGDC to ensure interagency coordi-
nation and to implement the National Spatial Data Infrastructure. Id. at 5.
150 Id. at 3.
151 See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
152 GEOSPATIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 3.
153 Id. In addition, it was recognized that public access to government geospatial
information is needed to "enforce laws and regulations for the protection of
public health and safety and the environment, land management, and other
public purposes." Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1.
156 Id. at 6-8.
157 Id. at 6.
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render a potential target more vulnerable to attack."'58 While guide-
lines are needed, the reality is that government decision-makers are
asked to stand in the shoes of a terrorist to determine whether a
person with evil intentions could conceivably use the data to cause
harm. For an intimidated American public, it may be too easy to
arrive at an affirmative answer. The guidelines attempt to allay this
concern by cautioning decision-makers to distinguish between what
is sensitive information and what is available by other means.
Additionally, the guidelines caution decision-makers "not to
automatically assume that the high cost or accuracy of data means
that the data [has] high value to an adversary."'59
When one identifies a security issue, the guidelines direct
the decision-maker to determine whether the "security costs
outweigh the anticipated societal benefits of active data dissemina-
tion."16 This is perhaps the most significant determination to be
15 GEOSPATIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 6. The guidelines further state that
decision-makers should consider whether the data:
[P]rovides accurate coordinates for facilities that are not
otherwise available and not visible from public locations[;]
[p]rovide[s] insights on choke points, which, if used to plan an
attack, would increase its effectiveness[;] [a]id[s] the choice of a
particular mode of attack by helping an adversary analyze a
feature to find the best way to cause catastrophic failure[;] [and]
[plrovide[s] relevant and current... security-related data that
are not otherwise available.
Id.
In determining whether the data would make a target more vulnerable, the
guidelines indicate that decision-makers should ask whether the data: "[i] dentify
internal features that are critical to the operation of a facility ... [;] [p]rovide
details on facility layout and vulnerabilities such as the location of security
personnel or storage areas for hazardous materials[;] [pirovide insights into
operational practices such as shift changes... [;] [and] [p]rovide relevant current
... vulnerability-related data." Id.
1' GEOSPATIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 7. The guidelines further point out
that decision-makers must determine whether the data is unique. While it may
be in many cases the only geospatial information that exists about a particular
location, if other available reference materials also disclose the same infor-
mation, then the information would not be unique.
160 Id. at 8.
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made. Again, the discretion exercised is not an exact science, and
could often lead decision-makers down the path of non-disclosure.161
For example, the guidelines instruct the decision-maker to
consider whether "sensitive information [would] cause security
costs such as: [a] significant increase in the likelihood of an
attack[;] [a] significant decrease in the difficulty of executing an
attack[; and a] significant increase in the damage caused by an
attack.162 If the answer to any of these inquiries is yes, then a
decision-maker must determine whether the "anticipated security
costs outweigh the anticipated societal benefits," '163 including:
"Continued or increasing effectiveness of public health and
safety[;] [c]ontinued or increasing support of legal rights (for
example, 'right to know')[;] [and] public involvement in decision-
making."'64 In ascertaining whether to 'safeguard data' (e.g., deny
public access) when the security risk could outweigh the benefit of
dissemination, the FGDC states that 'safeguarding' is only justified
if the sensitive information is unique to the data source.'6 5 It
follows that much of the GIS information removed from govern-
ment websites in the weeks following September 1 1th was likely
161 See EvANs & VOGUS, supra note 71. Two librarians noted in their review of
changing tides in government access policies that:
Clearly, the events of 9/11 have caused the government of the
United States as a whole to think about information access and
related policies. It is obvious that federal information.., has the
potential for use against the United States by foreign or
domestic terrorist groups or individuals, and as such the federal
government re-evaluating access and distribution policies makes
a degree of sense. The problem with such a philosophy is making
the determination as to what exactly constitutes harmful
information. In other words, while few would argue the merits
of curtailing certain forms of information, the uncertainty as to
just what sort of publications and Web sites will constitute
"dangerous" information leaves the impacts of these actions
unpredictable.
Id.




ad.165 Id. at 9.
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not justifiable since much of the data was no longer unique to the
primary web source due to downloads, copying, and republication
by others.
Where a decision-maker reaches the conclusion that certain
geospatial data has elements that justify safeguarding, the FGDC
recommends that the agency consider whether changing the data
(for example, the "redaction or removal of sensitive information
and/or reducing the sensitivity of information by simplification,
classification, aggregation, statistical summarization, or other
information reduction methods") sufficiently safeguards it so that
other useful aspects of the information could remain accessible.'66
If a decision-maker determines changes are appropriate, the
agency should "document the changes using the metadata."'6 7 This
reasonable approach favors at least some level of disclosure over
no disclosure at all. Much data within GIS generated maps, for
example, can be extremely useful to environmental advocates and
the public, without including all layers of available detail that
might compromise short-term security needs. Finding appropriate
ways to share as much information as possible on a timely basis,
albeit by withholding certain aspects or layers of data, can advance
the public's right to know, especially when the agency identifies
withheld information and validly justifies any nondisclosure.
166 GEOSPATIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 9. The FGDC notes that it is
important to determine whether the agency has the authority to change the data
(e.g., "laws, regulations, policies, or concerns about liability may compel [the
organization] to [simply] release data"). Id. at 10. The FGDC further notes that
where a decision-maker is uncertain about the agency's authority to change data,
they should seek a "policy decision" from that agency's management or legal
counsel. Additionally, the FGDC recommends that agencies have "written
procedures and policies describing the types of changes" that are authorized "and
the conditions under which [these actions will be] permitted." Id.
167 Id. at 9. The FGDC suggests
[flour types of information should be encoded in metadata: (1)
the fact that the geospatial data and metadata were reviewed
using the guidelines, (2) decisions that were made, (3) the date [s]
of the decisions, and (4) the safeguards (changes to the
geospatial data or restrictions on access, use, or dissemination
of the geospatial data and metadata) that were applied.
Id. at 14.
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The FGDC also suggests that agencies may wish to establish
different "levels of restriction [to] geospatial data."'68 For example,
the agency may determine that certain data must be
[g]enerally available to members of the public with
use and redistribution restrictions. Recipients may be
required to identify themselves before receiving the
geospatial data[;] available to other government
agencies or non-governmental organizations (for
example, the Red Cross), with use and redistribution
restrictions [;] available only to law enforcement, first
responder, and emergency management agencies
with use and redistribution restrictions[;] available
only to "partner" agencies from other levels of govern-
ment with use and redistribution restrictions[; and]
available only within your organization. 169
B. GIS Access and the Courts
Current litigation is making its way through the Connecti-
cut courts after the Town of Greenwich denied a request to provide
a member of the public with an electronic copy of certain informa-
tion contained in the town's GIS database. 7 ' The three million
dollar database contains, among other things, computer records
containing aerial photographs, road and sewer maps, and property
assessment data.' 7' In January 2004, the Superior Court of
Connecticut upheld a State Freedom of Information Commission
decision ordering the town to comply with a citizen's request for a
copy of the GIS database.'72 In defending its denial of the request,
16 8 Id. at 11.
169 id.
170 Dir., Dep't of Info. Tech., Greenwich v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 36 Conn. L.
Rptr. No. 9, 338, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3617 (New Britain 2003); see also
Ivan H. Golden, News Groups Back Release of Town Data, GREENWICH TIME,
Nov. 10, 2004 (on file with the William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy
Review).
171 Golden, supra note 170.
172 Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 9, at 338-39. The citizen
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the town relied on the testimony of its Chief of Police and argued
that the "release of the GIS database would result in the assis-
tance and facilitation of criminal and/or terrorist activities. 173
Finding "no nexus between [the Chief of Police's] opinion and the
ultimate" request denial, the court noted that no statistical data
offered would correlate to an increase in criminal activity or
potential terrorist type activity with disclosure of GIS data.174 The
court warned that "[a]nxiety concerning public safety should not
become a canard for creating an exemption" 175 from the require-
ments of public access.
III. DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE POLICY FOR GIS
INFORMATION
In an era of public fear of another terrorist attack, the
government has led the American public to believe that a choice
must be made between effective homeland security and the right
to access government information. 176 As one leading environmental
health advocate explained, however, "[tihe right to know should
submitted a FOIA request for "all [ofl the GIS database pertinent to ortho-
photography, Arc Info coverages which is a GIS software program, sequel server
which is a database format that houses the tax assessment records, and all
documentation created to support and define coverages for the Arc Info data set."
Id. The court noted that the "complainant carefully requested those portions of
the GIS database pertinent to orthophotography and tax assessments, which are
public records, and not the entire contents of the GIS database[,] which includes
additional information that may not be for public disclosure." Id. at 340.
173 Id. at 339-40.
174 Id. at 340.
175 Id.
176 See, e.g., Baumann Testimony, supra note 22 (Baumann stated that
"[u]nfortunately, some industry interests that have consistently opposed public
disclosure of the dangers they pose to neighboring communities have attempted
to frame the discussion of how to address this problem by pitting the public's
right to know against the need for-national security."); see also Parker, Johnson
& Locy, supra note 73, at Al. Gary Bass, executive director of OMB Watch,
stated that "[w]e seem to be shifting to the public's need to know instead of the
public's right to know." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not be considered a threat to national security or public safety."'77
The advocate further argued that restrictions on the public's right
to know, particularly the public's right to environmental and
public health data, will hurt public safety rather than protect it.
178
Even the federal government acknowledges that GIS technology is
critically important to helping the country meet its homeland
security goals, noting that "[t]he current state of geospatial
information technology can provide decision-makers the data they
need to confidently confront a wide variety of threats including
natural disasters, terrorist attacks, sabotage, and similar crises." '179
In its fiscal year 2003 Annual Report, the FGDC noted a continu-
ing need for "a clear, concise and enforceable policy regarding the
classification, privacy and proprietary nature of certain types of
geospatial data"' ° relative to homeland security. The Working
Group Summary Report 181 contained in the annual report acknowl-
edged that "homeland security data is faced with differing views on
what constitutes sensitive data and the conflicting desires to
177 Baumann Testimony, supra note 22.17 81 d. Baumann maintains that:
Choosing restrictions on the public's right to know about
hazards in communities, rather than actually reducing those
hazards, can hurt safety rather than help it. By restricting our
right to know, even through a well-intentioned effort to protect
[public] safety, government is abandoning its duty to warn the
public if a community is at risk.
Id. Baumann also notes in his testimony that restricting the public's right to
know prevents the public from participating in either the prevention of a
terrorist attack or the preparation of appropriate response plans. Id.
179 FGDC White Paper, supra note 69. The FGDC notes that "[a]s the concept of
Homeland Security becomes infused into the work-a-day pattern of government
and the everyday life of our citizens, decision makers [sic] will greatly profit from
the crisis management 'edge' that GIS provides." Id.
180 FED. GEOGRAPHIC DATA COMM., ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY (2003), available
at http://www.fgdc.gov/03nsdi/summaries/narrative.pdf.
"I' FED. GEOGRAPHIC DATA COMM. ANNUAL REPORT TO OMB (2003), available at
http://www.fgdc.gov/03nsdi/workinggroups/HSWG_2003_AnnualReport.pdf. The
Homeland Security Working Group ("HSWG") is a subcommittee of the Federal
Geographic Data Committee. The report is a directive to Agencies on the format
for their Annual Spatial Data Reports.
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protect sensitive information and to allow for broad participating
in processes, data development, and sharing."'82
An effective and reasonable public policy promoting public
access to GIS data and should have the following elements (1)
uniform laws to help state and local governments design and
implement appropriate public access policies for GIS data, (2) clear
criteria to assist government decision-makers in their determina-
tion of whether to grant public access requests for GIS data, and
(3) consistent interpretation and enforcement of these laws across
agencies at the same level of government. Furthermore, state and
local governments must partner in the development of GIS
information sharing policies because these government assemble
and maintain so much of the relevant and critical data for local
community sustainability 8 3
The RAND report suggests an appropriate framework for
assessing the potential risks posed by publicly accessible GIS
through the following three-part inquiry into the decision-making
182 FED. GEOGRAPHIC DATA COMM., WORKING GROUP REPORT SUMMARY (2003),
available at http://www.fgdc.gov/03nsdi/summaries/working-group.pdf. The
HSWG further noted that
[a] unique factor added by homeland security applications is the
need for confidentiality for some information and processes.
Challenges in this area include different views regarding what
is sensitive and authorities for protecting information, and
contradictions between the need to restrict access to information
and to provide for broad participation in processes and data
development and sharing.
FGDC ANNUAL REPORT TO OMB, supra note 181.
183 BAKER ET AL., supra note 20. According to the RAND report,
[s]tate and local governments use critical site geospatial
information to improve their operations and the services that
they supply to the public. For instance, they use geospatial
information about such features as water systems, utilities,
hazardous chemical sites, road systems, and property ownership
to maintain, inspect, regulate, and operate community
infrastructure and facilities; to prepare for emergency response,
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analysis involving (1) whether an attacker would find the informa-
tion useful, (2) whether the information is unique, and (3) "the
societal benefits and costs of restricting public access"' 4 to
particular data. The FGDC's interim guidelines closely track the
RAND protocols, offering further discussion and analytical
frameworks for decision-makers. So many different individuals,
including career civil servants and political appointees, exercise
discretion in determining the accessibility levels of various GIS
datasets. For example, those who decide whether to post informa-
tion to the agency website in the first instance are likely different
from those who will respond to a FOIA request for the data. It is
likely that no uniformity of results exists across agency lines.
Furthermore, but for the RAND report and the interim guidelines
that appear to set forth a roadmap for disclosure, federal policy
still weighs more heavily in favor of nondisclosure over public
accessibility, as evinced by Ashcroft's support for decision-makers'
leanings towards nondisclosure.
The federal government is not the only public source of
important government GIS data. State and local government
policies have not seen the scrutiny of a similar RAND-type study'
184BAKER ETAL., supra note 20, at xxvi. The RAND report suggests key questions
that could be asked for each of these factors. To determine usefulness, the
decision-maker should ask whether "the information [is] useful for target
selection or location purposes... [or] for attack planning purposes." Id. at xxvii.
To determine uniqueness, decision-makers should consider whether "the
information [is] readily available from other geospatial information sources...
[or] from direct observation or other information types." Id. Lastly, to assess the
societal benefits and costs, decision-makers should consider "the expected
security benefits of restricting public access to the source... [and] the expected
societal costs of restricting public access." Id.
185 BAKER ET AL., supra note 20, at 58-59. The RAND report noted that after
September 11th,
some state and local governments [were] restricting public
access to geospatial information . . . [h]owever, which
governments restrict and what they restrict appear to be
inconsistent... [s]uch inconsistencies among nonfederal entities
in restricting public access is another reason why a federal
analytical process is needed to assess and identify potentially
sensitive information by providing state and local governments
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and no national intergovernmental coordinating body exists to
provide technical assistance, training, and education for govern-
ment decision-makers on these issues. National standards must be
developed for application across governmental jurisdictions. A
government-university partnership should convene a national
summit with representatives from all levels of government and
academia. Individual attendees should include GIS professionals,
security specialists, and public access officers. In addition,
representatives of non-profit advocacy organizations, such as
environmental and public health advocates, must participate in
the discussion and development of policies to ensure balance of
clear justifications for the withholding of government GIS data
with the public's right to know.
The White House and the Department of Justice must
concurrently re-examine post-September 11, 2001 policies that
may support and promote even the appearance of secrecy in
government, if not the reality thereof. State and local governments
should likewise conduct similar intra-governmental assessments
and take necessary steps to re-open access to GIS data.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the message to
Americans from the public and private sector leadership was that
the country must continue with business as usual and that
deciding not to travel, not to participate in large public gatherings,
and to alter any other part of their typical daily routines would
signal that the American people were affected by terrorism.
The reverse is true as well. The government must not
continue to withhold important environmental and public health
related GIS data in response to a terrorist event or the threat of
further terrorist activity. Doing so compromises important values
of our democracy, including government accountability to the
a federal model that they can use in developing their own
approaches.
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people and an open and honest communication between the
government and the people. While many may have understood the
immediate post-September 11 reaction that produced such an
unprecedented shut-down of many information pipelines, these
quick reactions should have been temporary in nature, a brief
moratorium of sorts. Now that four years have passed, it is time to
re-open the flow of facts and figures. Achieving a sustainable
environment is dependent upon the ability of the community to
access relevant, accurate and timely information from its federal,
state, and local governments.
